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How could 20 years not be enough time?
The failure of two decades of training: Understanding why the Afghan Army was unable to withstand the Taliban’s advance
Ktah Khas Afghan Female Tactical Platoon members participate in morning physical training outside Kabul, Afghanistan May 29, 2016. The females work closely alongside the males on operations to engage and interact with women and children. The FTPs are trained in marksmanship, language, fast roping and other combat-related skills. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Douglas Ellis/Released)[/caption]
The fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban in August 2021 came as a shock to many who believed that the Afghan National Army (ANA) would be capable of defending the country after 20 years of training by the United States and its allies.
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The ANA's failure to prevent the Taliban's rapid advance underscores the fact that two decades was not enough to train a force capable of defeating the Taliban insurgency. Over the last 20 years, the US spent more than $83 billion training, equipping, and developing the Afghan National Army, Police, Air Force, and Special Forces. Yet, under the advance of an armed group carrying light weapons, the ANA fell apart in a spectacular fashion.
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">Why 20 years wasn’t enough to train the Afghan army to win<a href="https://t.co/znS6plQWH4">https://t.co/znS6plQWH4</a></p>— Military Times (@MilitaryTimes) <a href="https://twitter.com/MilitaryTimes/status/1630679676472500224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">February 28, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
There were several factors that contributed to the ANA’s inability to effectively resist the Taliban’s onslaught. One of the biggest challenges was corruption within the ANA’s leadership, which undermined the effectiveness of the force by sapping morale and diverting resources from training and equipping Soldiers. The ANA’s effectiveness was also hindered by a lack of reliable supply lines and the inability of the Afghan government to pay Soldiers’ salaries on time.
Moreover, the ANA’s reliance on foreign support meant that it was ill-prepared to function without the aid of US and NATO forces. When the US announced its withdrawal, the ANA lost access to essential intelligence, logistics, and air support that were critical to its ability to fight the Taliban. The Afghan military also struggled to replace aging equipment and to maintain existing weapons and vehicles, which hampered its ability to effectively counter the Taliban.
Another significant factor was the ANA’s inability to recruit and retain talented soldiers due to low pay, inadequate training, and high casualty rates. The force suffered from a high attrition rate, and many soldiers deserted or defected to the Taliban, further undermining the ANA’s effectiveness. This was exacerbated by frequent changes in leadership and political infighting, which further eroded the Army’s cohesion and ability to mount an effective defense.
While the ANA was able to make some progress over the past two decades, the challenges it faced were simply too great to overcome. The above-mentioned factors demonstrate that creating a capable and effective military force is not just a matter of training, but also requires addressing underlying political, economic, and social issues.
